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But the prisoners knew the purport of the paper. They produced it as their authority, and Sergeant Langdon had stated that he saw it posted up on one of the shutters. If the prisoners believed that they were thereby authorised, and that they were doing a perfectly proper act—and being ignorant men they might so believe—then they had committed no offence. If they knew as a fact that they were doing an improper act, then they were guilty of an offence. That was a question for the jury to decide, and to say whether they believed or not that prisoners were merely subordinates, at the direction of others, and were acting in a firm belief that they had legal and proper power.
And in reference to this point, it must be borne in mind that when the officers went to the house, they did not demur, they told the truth. They said "We have no coolies here, but we have licensed women." They did not by their actions disclose an intention to do anything unlawful, and so they were relieved from the first count of felony. It was impossible to prove felonious intent on their part; at the worst the offence could under the circumstances be only a misdemeanour.
As to the first prisoner, the man described by the learned counsel who was engaged for the defence before the police bench, as being the "contractor" for the supply of coolies, and who held the Lobscheid certificate, there was little or no evidence to show that he had had anything to do with the women. Mr. Tonnachy's evidence to be sure was that the first prisoner was taking down the names of certain persons, and apparently inspecting them, "but no doubt" merely to see if such certain persons would be suitable for emigration to Dutch Guiana.
Sergeant Langdon said that the second prisoner seemed to be the master of the place. If the second prisoner ever knew that he was keeping people there unlawfully, no doubt he must be found guilty of misdemeanour; but after what the jury had heard—that there had been no secrecy about the thing—that a placard openly stated that a ship, the Portland, would sail with the people at a certain time, and that the ship would sail with the knowledge of the Netherlands Consul, and of the Government—in presence of these facts, might not the prisoners have naturally thought that they were doing a lawful act, and that they were doing what they were called on to do, and what they were paid for at the rate of $4, $5 or $6 a month.
The Attorney General corrected the learned counsel in his interpretation of the law. The intent of the prisoners must be inferred from their acts, whatever might be their own opinion.
His Honor: Certainly, you need not care what their intent was, so long as you find there was imprisonment.
Mr. Barnard quoted to the effect that proof of intent must be shown.
The Attorney General said that was a matter purely for the jury, and His Honor observed that the jury had better be addressed on the first count.
Mr. Barnard accordingly continued to urge that intent in this case must be kept in view, and if the jury believed that prisoners committed any act, innocent of wilful knowledge, they were entitled to an acquittal, especially the first prisoner, who happened to be in the house when the officers called.
This was the case for the defence.
His Honour summed up. He commenced by remarking that the case had not been so short as he had anticipated; but from its peculiar character he did not regret the time it had occupied, nor, he was sure, did the jury. The jury had a very serious duty to perform. The question before them was one which required careful consideration, not so much with reference to this particular transaction, but that it might be known what the law is in such cases—as to what were the consequences of offences like this, when they were fully proved.
They had already heard the charge against the prisoners. He would present it to them with inverted counts. The second count was that prisoners had unlawfully imprisoned a woman, one Chu-a-lin, in Victoria. That was all the charge. There was nothing about intent. Whether prisoners thought they were justified or not, whether they unlawfully kept her in prison for one or for five hundred days, mattered nothing. The charge was, that they did imprison.
If the jury found detention against will proved in this case, it was his duty as judge to tell them that they were bound to find the prisoners guilty of unlawful imprisonment. He wished the jury to understand clearly what, in a legal sense, was meant by "imprisonment." It did not mean only to put a man within the walls of an actual prison. It did not only mean to put a man in gaol. The place of "imprisonment" might be a private house, in a sitting room. "Imprisonment" consisted in unlawfully keeping a person in a particular place contrary to his wish, and preventing him going at large at his own will. That was the law of England.
The mere fact of preventing a man going where he lawfully might, and either by a threat or by a false statement, inducing him to go to a particular place and telling him he must remain there, constituted false imprisonment. But that kind of false imprisonment was only a misdemeanour.
All that the prosecutor would have in such case to prove would be the fact of imprisonment. It would be for the defendant to show that he was justified in what he did, and that the imprisonment was lawful. The question therefore for the jury to decide was very simple so far.
But the Attorney General had suggested, in the first count on which the prisoners had been indicted, that this was not simply a case of false imprisonment; but that, more than that, it came within one of the statutes provided in this colony, and the Attorney General indicted the prisoners for imprisonment "with intent to sell." If a person was really detained against her will with such an intent, then the imprisonment would be a felony.
Then came, therefore, the question, did the prisoners, or any of them, intend to sell Chu-a-Lin? With regard to intent, the law said that it must be derived from the act, so that the jury would have to draw their own inference in this case. If they found that the act had been accompanied by such other circumstances as would lead to the conclusion that the act pointed to the end and intent charged, then, if they believed the woman was detained against her will—though there was no evidence that there had been a sale—it would be for the jury to say on their consciences, did they believe this imprisonment was, or was not, for the purposes of gain?
His Honor read the clause in the ordinance creating the offence under the first count, and continued. There were two points for the jury to consider: Did the mode of imprisonment prevent the woman going at large at her will? If they said that it did—and the defence had not suggested any lawful ground of imprisonment—then, if they believed the woman was imprisoned for any period, they would find a verdict of guilty on the second count, if they believed the prisoners did intend to sell the woman.
And then, if they did so intend to sell, the jury would consider whether it was from a motive of great benevolence that the woman was taken into the house and kept there for her own benefit, or with some other intent. That was for the jury to decide. They must say, was the woman detained from...
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the prisoners knew the purport of the pa- per, They produced it as their authority, and Sergeant Langdon had stated that he saw it posted up on one of the shutters, If the prisoners believed that they were there- by authorised, and that they were doing a perfectly proper act--and being ignorant men they might so believe-then they had committed no offence. If they knew as a fact that they were doing an improper act, then they were guilty of an offence. that was a question for the jury to decide, and to say whether they believed or unf that prisoners were merely subordinates, at the direction of others, and were acting in a firm belief that they had legal and proper power. And in reference to this point, it must be borne in mind that when the offi- eers went to the house, they did not demur, they told the truth. They said "We have no coolies here, but we have license women." They did not by their actions disclosed in- tend to do anything unlawful, and so they were relieved from the first count of felony. It was impossible to prove felo- nious intent on their part; at the worst the offence could under the circumstances be only a misdemeanour. As to the first prisoner the man described by the learned counsel who was engaged for the defence before the police bench, as being the "con- tractor" for the supply of coolies, and who held the Lobscheid certificate] there was little or no evidence to show that he had had anything to do with the women. Mr Tonnachy's evidence to be sure was that the first prisoner was taking down the names of certain persons, and apparently inspecting them, "but no doubt" merely to see if such certain persons would be suitable for emigration to Dutch Guiana. Sergeant Langdon said that the second pri soner seemed to be the master of the place. If the second prisoner ever knew that he was keeping people there unlawfully, no doubt he must be found guilty of misdemeanour ; but after what the jury had heard that there had been no secrecy about the thing that a placard openly stated that a strip, the Portland, would sail with the people at a certain time, and that the ship would sail with the knowledge of the Nether- lands Consul, and of the Government: in presence of these facts, might not the prisoners have naturally thought that they were doing a lawful act, and that they ronarly doing what they were oslled on to do, and what they were paid for at the rate of $4, $5 or $6 a month.
The Attorney General corrected the learned counsel in his interpretation of the law. The intent of the prisoners must be inferred from their acts, whatever might be their own opinion.
His Honor Certainly, you need not care what their intent was, so long as you find there was imprisonment.
Mr Barnard quoted to the effect that proof of intent must be shown.
The Attorney General said that was a matter purely for the jury, and His Honor observed that the jury had better be ad- dressed on the first count.
Mr Barnard accordingly continued to urge that intent in this case must be kept in view, and if the jury believed that pri- soners committed any act, innocent, of wilful knowledge, they were entitled to an acquit- tal especially the first prisoner, who hap pened to be in the house when the officers called.
.
This was the case for the defence.
His Honour summed up. He com uenced by remarking that the case had not been so short as he had anticipated; but from its peculiar character he did not regret the time it had occupied, nor, he was sure, did the jury. The jury bad a verv serious duty to perform. The question before them was one which required careful con-¡ sideration, not so much with reference to
this particular transaction, but that it might be known what the law is in such cases -as to what were the consequences of offences like this, when they were fully proved. They had already heard the charge against the prisoners. He would present it to them with inverted counts. The second count was that prisoners had unlawful- ly imprisoned a woman, one Chu-a- lin, in Victoria. That was all the charge. There was nothing about întent. Whether prisoners thought they were justi- fied or not, whether they unlawfully kept her in prison for one or for five hundred days, mattered nothing. The charge was, that they did imprison. If the jury found de- tention against will proved in this case, it was his duty as judge to tell them that they were bound to find the prisoners guil- ty of unlawful imprisonment. He wished the jury to understand clearly what, in a logal sense, was meant by "imprisonment." It did not mean only to put a man within the walls of an actual prison. It did not only mean to put a man in gaol. The place of "imprisonment" might be a private house, in a sitting room, "Imprisonment" consisted in unlawfully keeping a person in a particular place contrary to his wish, and preventing him going at large at his own will. That was the law of England. The mere fact of preventing a man going where he lawfully might, and either by a threat or by a false statement, inducing him to go to a particular place and telling him he must remain there, constituted false im- prisonment, But that kind of false impri- sonment was only a misdeamomor.
All that the prosecutor would have in such case to prove would be the fact of impri- Bonment. It would be for the defendant to show that he was justified in what he did, and that the imprisonment was lawful. The question therefore for the jury to de- cide was very simple so far. But the At- torney General had suggested, in the first count on which the prisoners had been in- dicted, that this. was not simply a case of false imprisonment; but that, more than that, it came within one of the statutes pro- vided in this colony, and the Attorney Ge neral indicted the prisoners for imprison- ment "with intent to sell." If a person was really detained against her will with such an intent, then the imprisonment would be a felony. Then came, therefore, the question, did the prisoners, or any of them, intend to sell Chu a Lin? With regard to intent, the law said that it must be derived from the act, so that the jury would have to draw their own inference in this case.
If they found that the act had been accompanied by such other circun- stances as would lead to the conclusion that the act pointed to the end and intent charged, then, if they believed the woman was detained against her will-though there was no evidence that there had been a aale---it would be for the jury to say on their consciences, did they believe this imprisonment was' or was not, for the purposes of gain? His Honor read the clause in the ordinance creating the offence under the first count, and continued. There were two points for the jury to con- sider: Did the mode of imprisonment pre- vent the woman going at large at her will? If they said that it did-and the defence had not suggested any lawful ground of imprisonment-then, if they believed the Wonian was imprisoned for any period, they would find a verdict of guilty on the first count, if they believed the prisoners did intend to sell the woman. And then, if they did so intend to sell, the jury would consider whether it was from a motive of great benevolence that the woman was taken into the house and kept there for her own benefit, or with some other intent. That was for the jury to decide. They must say, was the woman detained from
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